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3Abstract
The growth and development of the United States’ non-profit sector in its service and civil society
capacities could not have taken the course it did by relying solely on private voluntary contributions.
Within the US non-profit sector, there few large “pure” non-profit service providers that rely solely
on private donations.  However, public-private partnerships are the modus vivendi of America’s
contemporary non-profit sector largely because public-private partnerships are a basic characteristic
of American politics and social welfare system—not by design but by happenstance. At the turn of the
century, however, we are witnessing an emerging trend that could lead to major changes in public-
private partnerships. As we discuss in this paper, blurring sectoral boundaries have become more
frequent, and the role of for-profit firms has become more pronounced. While it is difficult to gauge
what the end result of these developments might be, it is safe to assume that more complex forms of
partnerships will evolve. Future policy scenarios will increasingly include various combinations
among government, business and non-profit providers. What is more, the three-way partnerships of
the future will involve organisations no longer strictly bound by their legal form or sector
membership. Organisational form may become more project-specific rather than a constant as was the
case in the past.
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Public-private partnerships in the United States:
Historical patterns and current trends
Lynne Moulton and Helmut K Anheier
1 Introduction
In the United States, the non-profit sector has consistently relied on federal, state, and local
governments for a significant proportion of its funds and clients since the 1960s.  Smith and Lipsky
(1993) report that government financing often accounts for over half the income of non-profit social
service agencies and that there are hundreds of contractual arrangements between public and private
non-profit entities in any given state of the union. These arrangements reflect the unique type of
welfare state operating through the political economy of the United States.
Voluntary free association among citizens preceded the development of the government apparatus and
the corporation as means for pursuing collective action in the United States (Salamon 1998; Smith
and Lipsky, 1993). Throughout the history of this country, registered and unregistered non-profit
organisations assumed a variety of roles addressing public needs defined outside the scope of either
the state or private enterprise. Along with their fundamental role as service providers, non-profits
offer a complement to the formal political system as the organisational sphere through which citizens
can participate in the democratic process. For example, non-profit organisations account for half of
the country’s hospitals, colleges, and universities; 60 per cent of the social service agencies; and most
of the civic organisations (Salamon, 1998). In addition, every social movement and effort to defend
citizens’ rights can trace its roots back to the non-profit sector (Melendez, 1998).
The growth and development of the non-profit sector in its service and civil society capacities could
not have taken the course it did by relying solely on private voluntary contributions. Need
consistently outweighs levels of private donations to non-profit organisations. In many other
industrialised countries, this situation often inspired the development of expansive public social
service apparatuses. The United States, however, has been historically loathe—from both liberal and
conservative perspectives—to rely solely on centralised government structures for the provision of
public goods and turned instead to the private non-profit sector.
Direct government support of non-profit organisations comes in the form of direct payments, tax
exemption, preferential regulatory treatment, and deductibility of donations. Non-profits also benefit
indirectly from payments through subsidies to individual clients. The public-private partnerships,
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which result from this array of support mechanisms and allow the non-profit sector to assume the
roles at the scale described above, are the focus of this chapter.
Public-private partnerships generally take the form of purchase-of-services contracts, where
government entities buy services from non-profit contracting agencies. Programs that rely on
contracting often require contractors to be non-profit entities. These contracts are characterised by
relatively short funding cycles where the government funder enjoys varying control over admission
criteria, service delivery, and discharge decisions for clients of the contracted services. Smith and
Lipsky (1993) refer to this partnership configuration as a “contracting regime” in which public and
private agencies are involved in a mutually dependent but not equal relationship. These contractual
arrangements typically subordinate non-profit agencies to a hegemonic state that often seem to serve
as more of a sponsor than a partner to their non-profit contractors (Smith and Lipsky 1993, pp. 44–
45).
American culture, like those of other countries, contains certain classic polarities, “inner tensions”
and contradictions. In the United States, one such tension involves the deeply seated notions of
American individualism and self-reliance on the one hand, and commitments to community, formal
equality, justice and civic virtues on the other (Bellah, 1985). Within this cultural context, American
political economy takes place. It is, first of all, a political economy capable of enacting policies that
have become landmarks of modern legislative history that reach over much of the 20th century—from
the New Deal programs of the 1930s, the GI Bill in the late 1940s, the civil rights legislation and the
Great Society programs over the next two decades, to affirmative action policies, and the welfare
reform of the Clinton Administration in the 1990s.
All these policies represent bold moves to address what are perceived as pressing social, economic
and political problems and issues: unemployed people, soldiers returning home, war widows left
without sufficient income, elderly people, African Americans, and the ongoing policy debate about
the deserving and the undeserving poor. They are demand-driven policies (Skocpol, 1992; Amenta,
1988), that neither represent nor amount to a systematic and comprehensive approach to address
social problems. Particular groups with specific agendas can exert considerable influence on
American policies, if political constellations accommodate them and their demands meet the political
needs of other stakeholders (Laumann and Knoke, 1987). The war widows of Word War I and II
pressed for social security and found a government both sympathetic and politically open, and hence
amenable to bold initiatives. The civil rights movement pressed for affirmative action and equal
opportunities, and met a government willing to take on their demands, at least in part.
The result of demand-driven policies is, as many observers of the US welfare state have noted
(Amenta, 1988), a patchwork approach to social policy, and an approach altogether distinct in style
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and aspiration from the European model. This contrast applies not only to social democracy and
Christian democratic ideas of policy-making, but also to large-scale programs like the National Health
Service in Britain.  None of these approaches fit the American style of policy-making.
What, then, is the US model?  We have already noted the demand-driven aspect of it, and the patch-
work character of the overall result. These characteristics are made possible by an electorate that can
be seen as reconciling three value streams (Lipset, 1996):
• Individual freedom, formal equality before the law, and due process;
• High levels of tolerance for significant disparities in material wealth and well-being combined
with a believe in individual advancement and responsibility (the “American Dream”), and
• A “taken-for-grantedness” that the US style of government is the best blue-print for the political
constitution of society and system of government that requires only “fine-tuning,” never major
“overhauls” to maintain and perfect it.
The overall result is a small government at local, state and federal levels by international standards.
What is more, it is both a strong and a weak form of government. It is strong because of its secure
moorings in a democratic tradition and process more than 200 years old, and the deeply embedded
democratic ideals in the population. By contrast, the government is weak because it can actually do
very little on its own without involving third parties as partners. Limited financial resources and lack
of popular support help prevent all levels of government, and particularly the Federal level, to assume
any exclusive role of service provider in many fields that are the prominent domain of the state in
most other countries: culture, education, health, social services, community development,
environmental protection, international development, to mention a few.
Frequently, government is only in a position to finance some of the major parts of policy
implementation. Rarely, however, can Federal and state governments actually offer the services
themselves by building up a network of institutions dedicated for such purposes. The result is a
system of what Salamon (1995) called third party government—an emerging model whereby
governments at all levels involve private organisations in delivering public services. Typically, these
partner organisations are non-profit entities, and, as we will see below, increasingly business
corporations.
Thus, the US government works closely with the non-profit sector to address a variety of social
problems (Salamon, 1995). Whereas common notions of welfare states assume that welfare provision
corresponds to the size of the public social service apparatus (Quadagno, 1987), the American version
of the welfare state consists of a public sector that makes policy, generates tax revenue, and hires
private non-profit and for-profit agencies to manage and deliver goods and services.
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Within the US non-profit sector, there are few large “pure” non-profit service providers that rely
solely on private donations. “Contrary to the common view, non-profits are far from independent of
private enterprise and government. They compete and collaborate with these other organisations in
countless ways in their efforts to finance themselves, to find workers, managers, and other resources
to produce their outputs, and to develop markets for those outputs” (Weisbrod 1998, p. 4). This
partnership arrangement reflects the rugged individual vs. community member dichotomy of
American culture, the pluralistic tenets of the political structure, and “represents a pragmatic,
piecemeal adaptation to prevailing realities that emerged in ad hoc fashion in different fields
(Salamon and Anheier 1998, p. 158). In summary, public-private partnerships are a basic
characteristic of American politics and social welfare system—not by design but by default in the
absence of any co-ordinated social welfare regime. Public-private partnership is also the modus
vivendi of America’s contemporary non-profit sector.
2 Theoretical background
Many theories of the non-profit sector argue that public collaboration with non-profit agencies also
represents a division of labour in the provision of collective goods, co-ordinating the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each sector. These theories describe the relationship between
government and the non-profit sector as complementary and symbiotic. The third party government
theory (Salamon, 1987), for example, conceives of the non-profit sector as the preferred mechanism
for the provision of public goods. From this perspective, solving new and expanding social and
economic problems is most appropriately and effectively accomplished on a voluntary bottom-up
basis (Lipsky and Smith, 1989–90). Government is the secondary institution that steps in when the
voluntary sector “fails”. Reliance on the non-profit sector for performance of various government
functions, in turn, allows the US government to promote general welfare without expanding its
administrative apparatus (Salamon, 1987).
The public goods theory, on the other hand, reverses the logic of the third party government theory.
From this perspective, the government, whose responsibility it is to produce public goods, fails to
finance goods and services that meet the needs of the entire population, particularly in heterogeneous
societies with a diversity of needs. The non-profit sector exists to satisfy demands for collective
products and services left un-funded by the government (Weisbrod, 1988). While the logic of the
third party government theory and the public goods theory make different assumptions about how
government and non-profits come to be mutually dependent, both see such co-ordination as optimal
within modern industrialised economies.
The assumption among many scholars of the non-profit sector is that non-profit organisations offer
the state a flexible, localised way to respond to emerging or entrenched social and economic
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problems. These organisations are more able than government bureaucracies to be both responsive to
shifting public needs and to establish long-term service relationships with clients. Government
agencies can rely on existing, often community-based, organisations to manage and deliver
specialised goods and services that would be costly for them to establish and maintain. In doing so,
the government also shifts the financial and political risks of collective good provision to the non-
profit sector.  In turn, non-profits receive reliable streams of funding and clients, tax exemption, and
preferential regulatory treatment from public sources.
Much recent research on the mutual dependence between the public and private non-profit spheres
shows that this partnering is not always straightforward and uncomplicated (see Lipsky and Smith,
1998-90; Smith and Lipsky, 1993). The prevailing concern in recent work is how government funding
impacts upon the scope and direction of its non-profit recipients.  Non-profit experts ask if
government support affects management decisions in ways that pull non-profit organisations away
from their missions (Weisbrod, 1998; Lipsky and Smith, 1989–90). Some scholars wonder if the
comparative benefits of non-profit service provision over for-profit provision warrants continued
government political and financial protection (Bloche, 1998; Schlesinger et al, 1996). Still others
worry about the impact on the sector of the recent and simultaneous trends of government
retrenchment on social welfare spending, for-profit encroachment into traditionally non-profit
industries, and the subsequent commercialisation of the non-profit sector (Ryan, 1999; Salamon,
1999; Weisbrod, 1998).
In the balance of this paper, we will explore these and other issues related to the coupling of the
public and non-profit sector in the United States political economy.
3 Extent of the public-private partnership
The mutual dependence between the public and private sectors was established in large part during
the Great Society days of the 1960s and 1970s with much of the sector’s growth happened during that
period and has held ground since then. Non-profit organisations received over 50 per cent of federal
social service expenditures in 1989, up from almost nothing in 1960 (Lipsky and Smith, 1989–90).
Some small organisations rely on government funds for their entire budgets (Lipsky and Smith 1989–
90). In fact, public money is so important to the on-going financial stability of non-profit social
service agencies, that non-profit coalitions, advocacy groups, and “affinity groups” now exist, whose
partial or sole mission is to lobby the government for increased government spending for a variety of
their social and economic welfare causes from youth services to care for older people (Oliver, 1999).
While government support of the non-profit sector continues to grow—albeit at a slower pace and
mostly in the health care industry—recent policy-making trends have begun to alter the long-standing
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public-private partnership arrangement. Beginning with the presidency of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the
federal government has pursued an ongoing campaign to both “reduce big government” and “reinvent
government”, which are catch phrases for retrenching social program spending and streamlining
government bureaucracy.
In keeping with this dual agenda, devolution of responsibility for a wide variety of health and welfare
issues has simultaneously changed the structure and reduced the level of government funding for non-
profit activities across the board.  Over the last two decades, fifty-seven federal grant categories were
consolidated into 9 block grants that carried lighter funding for state programs (Coble, 1999). Also as
part of this process, funding structures to social service agencies shifted from the reimbursement plans
of conventional contracting to performance contracts that emphasise efficiency and capacity (Behn
and Kant, 1999; Ryan, 1999).
With this new focus on accountability and performance came a new-found recognition of qualities
that for-profit firms could bring to the service provision table. Throughout the past decade, public
funders at all levels of government began relaxing their historical resistance to contracting with for-
profit organisations to manage and deliver social welfare services. The consequences of this trend for
the non-profit sector is an increasing level of competition for government contracts and the
encroachment of for-profit firms in social service industries that had been traditionally non-profit
domains. As government spending shrinks and competition from for-profit providers increases, non-
profit organisation must find alternative funding sources. Increasingly, the non-profit sector has come
to rely more heavily on commercial income, which accounted for over half of the sector’s revenue
growth from 1977–1996 (Salamon, 1999, pp. 70–71).
4 Consequences of public support
According to the non-profit literature, the consequences arising from the mutual dependence of the
public and private sector are twofold.  One set of consequences involves non-profit sector changes—
potential and actual—due to reliance on public funds in general.  For example, some scholars argue
that fundamental differences in priorities between the public and private sectors create myriad
opportunities for conflict, the underlying assumption being that non-profits will tend to adjust their
behaviours to satisfy the agendas of their public funders. To whatever extent government agendas
differ from those of the non-profit organisations seeking funding, non-profits are at risk of having to
stray from their intended missions to attract and keep public funding. In fact, Lipsky and Smith
caution that “government contracting may alter non-profit agencies’ approaches to services and
clients, even if their goals are entirely compatible with those of government.  In essence, they may be
forced to conform to standards imposed by contracting policy at the expense of their home-grown
notions of what constitutes effective service delivery” (1989–90, p. 638, emphasis ours). In particular,
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non-profit scholars worry that non-profit organisations will become too bureaucratised, over-
professionalised, and politicised as a result of governmental influence. Non-profits might also lose
their autonomy and flexibility regarding a number of organisational goals and succumb to
“vendorism,” where the organisational mission is distorted in the pursuit for government support
(Salamon, 1987).
Another set of consequences of public-private partnerships concerns the impact of for-profit
encroachment into non-profit fields of operation and the accompanying emphasis on efficiency and
capacity within government contracting. To both compete and compensate for shrinking federal
dollars, non-profit firms are becoming increasingly commercialised with moves into sales and
investment. The extent of this commercialism within the non-profit sector varies considerably by
industry (see Weisbrod, 1998, table 1.2, p. 17). Nonetheless, non-profits in a variety of industries are
engaged in selling theme license plates, opening health clubs and off-site museum stores, leasing
mailing lists, sponsoring conferences, publishing journals, loaning their logos, licensing and patenting
discoveries, among many other fee generating income strategies (Anheier and Toepler, 1998; Cain
and Merritt, Jr, 1998; Powell and Owen-Smith, 1998; Weisbrod, 1998; Young, 1998). In addition to
commercial outputs, non-profits are commercialising in terms of the labour market as well. As Ayres-
Williams writes, “the sector can now afford to be an employer of choice. Gone is the image of do-
gooders working inefficiently and at pittance wages for the sheer pleasure of helping others. The
reality of operating with multimillion dollar budgets has led most non-profits to adopt a more focused
business approach” (1998, p. 110). With commercial activity representing the largest proportion of
income growth for non-profits across the board, the question remains whether and to what extent non-
profit commercialism affects both public-private partnerships and the character of the non-profit
sector as a whole.
4.1 Business-like non-profits
As non-profits increasingly embark on commercial activities and as government funders place more
weight on performance and capacity measures in contracting relationships, the argument that non-
profit organisations are the most effective mechanisms for managing and delivering public goods is
called into question. The prevailing concern is that non-profit response to increasing competition will
be to adopt more business-like management strategies that compromise the social benefits non-profit
organisations contribute in a variety of industries. The health care field, for example, has seen
dramatic growth in commercialisation, mergers, and conversions to for-profit status among non-profit
hospitals and other non-profit health care organisations. The aftermath of these transformations
provides an opportunity to evaluate the continuing role of the non-profit sector in health care
provision.
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One concern is how these transformations affect hospital pricing. Most economic models of non-
profit hospital pricing assume that non-profit hospitals depart from profit-maximising production
choices because they tend to spend their profit in ways that meet objectives that match their
organisational mission to provide care, education, and improve quality. Melnick et al (1999) argue,
however, that non-profits are nearly as likely as for-profit hospitals to meet their organisational
objectives by raising prices, especially in a concentrated health care market increasingly dominated
by managed care. In their econometric model of hospital pricing, they also found that expected price
increases depended on ownership and market share of merging hospitals. Although merging for-profit
hospitals are more likely than merging non-profit hospitals to use their increased market share to raise
prices, merging non-profit hospitals are likely to raise prices after mergers, just at a slightly smaller
rate than among for-profit hospitals. Such findings indicate that non-profit behaviour is not
unchanged by increasing competition with for-profit firms. The extent to which ownership status and
commercialisation affect public-private partnerships is an empirical question that warrants exploration
as conversion and commercialisation trends increase in the health care field and beyond.
Some scholars now speculate about the justification of continued preferential treatment of non-profit
organisations from the government. Again from the health care field, Bloche (1999) argues that the
“putative social advantages” of the non-profit form over for-profit ownership status in health care
financing are uncertain and do not compensate for the costs of government protection.  He claims that
non-profit health care facilities are no more likely to provide free care to the poor than for-profits and
vary in their production of other social benefits, such as research and health care promotion.
Therefore, according to Bloche, these uneven social benefits do not mitigate direct and indirect
economic costs to the government enough to warrant continued protection of the non-profit category
of health care organisations. This perspective contends that the government should pull even farther
away from non-profit sector and allow a more free market approach to social service delivery.
Another perspective on government support of non-profits holds more to the notion that the public-
non-profit relationship has been and should remain mutually dependent. Melnick et al (1999), for
example, suggest that changing organisational behaviour within the non-profit sector actually
warrants closer attention to the sector in terms of regulation. They argue that non-profit organisations
respond to regulatory pressures better than for-profit firms. So by retaining their close relationships
with the non-profit sector, government funders are still in a good position to control the output of
collective goods from the non-profit sector (Lipsky and Smith, 1989–90). This leverage may be
especially distinct within periods of constricted government spending where there is increased
competition for less funding.
Schlesinger et al (1996) extend this argument by suggesting a regulatory division of labour within the
government for the non-profit sector. They maintain that the Internal Revenue Service should define
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the parameters of the potential community benefit of the non-profit sector and define these benefits
broadly enough to capture all possible dimensions of non-profit contributions. According to their
scheme, other policy makers should then be left to prioritise these benefits because they have “a better
understanding of trade-offs among competing goals for public action and who are more responsive to
contemporary public concerns” (p. 738). This perspective recognises the political nature of service
provision and government contracting, arguing that the government needs to do more than provide
funding to assure that collective goods provision meets demand.
Still other scholars find that non-profit organisations do still behave in traditionally beneficial ways,
justifying continued government support of the non-profit form. Ryan (1999) argues that non-profits
generally spend surplus on mission-related activities, promote civic virtues, and advocate for the
publics they serve.  Weisbrod writes that these other findings of “differential organisation behaviour
suggest, but do not necessarily prove, that when financial constraints allow, non-profits do behave in
a fundamentally different manner from for-profit organizations” (1999, p. 12). This argument
maintains that these behavioural differences between non-profit and for-profit organisations should
give the non-profit form a comparative advantage in the competition for public funds.
Ryan (1999) cautions that the community benefits non-profits do offer are threatened by for-profit
encroachment. When competition drives prices down, non-profits are likely to be left with less
surplus revenue to spend on mission-related activities. In addition, competition with for-profits for
government contracts may divide the client pools. For-profits will likely seek those clients who are
easiest to serve, leaving harder, more expensive cases to non-profit providers. This perspective
suggests that continued or even increased government support of the non-profit sector is crucial to
preserve the collective benefits that non-profit organisations provide.
Another danger surrounding these new patterns is that non-profit organisations might succumb to
“institutional cusp pressures” and become more for-profit-like as boundaries between the non-profit
sector and the for-profit sector continue to blur (Alexander, 1998, p. 275). Non-profit scholars and
advocates worry that non-profit entities will take the “if you can’t beat them, join them” response too
much to heart, at the expense of their intended missions.
5 New contracting patterns
Government funds still play an important role in the financial stability of non-profit organisations
across industries, but this role has changed to accommodate for-profit entrance into traditionally non-
profit service areas and the resulting collaboration between sectors. More and more, public money
becomes a linchpin for non-profit partnerships with for-profit entities. Non-profit organisations
increasingly find that they must team up with for profit firms to compete for larger, consolidated
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funding streams. This trend is partially the result of push factors from the government. Social
spending retrenchment, emphasis on accountability in contracting relationships, devolution of social
welfare responsibility to states and local governments, and the dismantling of many New Deal/Great
Society welfare programs have disrupted long-standing partnerships between government agencies
and non-profit social service providers.
For example, YWCA of greater Milwaukee recently faced a 40 per cent revenue reduction as the
Wisconsin legislature consolidated existing social service programs to develop an aggressive welfare
reform package.  On their own, YWCA did not have the resources to make a competitive bid for the
new $40 million welfare-to-work contract. Their response was to seek out a partnership with two for-
profit firms to build the scale and managerial capacity to win the contract. The newly formed YW
Works now provides almost every service that welfare recipients need in finding a job (Ryan, 1999).
Other cases of non-profit partnerships with for-profit firms demonstrate how public money can help
give non-profit organisations leverage with local business leaders, inspiring a variety of collaborative
efforts in service delivery. For example, seven states have developed trust funds for affordable
housing, ranging from $10–50 million. These funds are awarded to local community developers to
build and manage low and moderate-income housing. The Rio Tower project, a housing facility for
elderly poor, in the Little Havana district of Miami was built with Florida’s trust fund money. The
non-profit East Havana Community Development Corporation built and now manages the facility.
Non-profit housing coalitions in various states have been able to use the local infusion of trust fund
money to leverage additional revenue from local realtors and homebuilders in the form of real estate
transfer fees (Wayne, 1998).
The US credit industry offers another example of how new welfare policy initiatives, government
funds, and regulation create an environment that fosters public partnerships with non-profit and for-
profit organisations in a variety of combinations. In the process of dismantling several public
assistance programs, politicians have adopted “hand up, not hand out” rallying slogans in support of
new programs that promote self-sufficiency.  Some of the most politically popular self-sufficiency-
type initiatives are micro-finance programs. Borrowed from similar initiatives implemented
throughout the developing world, these programs are designed to provide credit and financial training
to low-income entrepreneurs and homebuyers (Edgcomb, Klein and Clark, 1996). As this strategy
became popularised among US policy-makers and public funds became available for such programs,
hundreds of new and existing non-profit community and economic development organisations have
started revolving loan funds and other types of local lending programs.
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Micro-finance programs suit the needs of the government, business, and non-profit sectors through
the three-way formal and informal partnerships they inspire among the three sectors. Politicians have
an interest in providing funds for such initiatives so they can fulfil social welfare objectives that begin
to compensate for retrenchment of other public assistance programs. However, in keeping with the
trend of reducing government, they do not want to administer these lending programs.  Instead, they
rely heavily on for-profit and non-profit partnerships to develop and manage these initiatives at the
local level. For profits, particularly banks, participate in these micro-finance initiatives to boost their
public image, meet regulatory demands for local investment, and tap federal funding streams.1
Community and economic development organisations take advantage of these federal dollars so they
can continue to provide investment capital in their service areas in spite of cuts in other federal
programs. Still, these credit programs are rarely self-sufficient in spite of expanded public funding in
the past ten years. As a result, such programs often co-ordinate with local banks and businesses for
additional funding, technical assistance provision, and client referrals. These non-profit lenders also
maintain relationships with local banks so they may refer clients back to the banks when the clients’
needs grow beyond micro-finance lending caps (Moulton, 2000).
Through these micro finance initiatives, millions of federal dollars filters from the US Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Small Business Administration (SBA) down
through variable structures of local governments, for-profit, and non-profit organisations to individual
borrowers. These sectors form partnerships in various ways to disburse these funds and pool financial
and technical resources. For example, the SBA and HUD Program for Investments in
Microentrepreneurs (PRIME) funnels federal dollars to private for-profit venture capital and other
investment companies for investment in local small business initiatives (White House Fact Sheet, 5
February 1999; SBA Press Release, 15 January 1999). These investment coalitions often co-ordinate
with local banks for additional funds and technical expertise and with non-profit agencies for their
existing network access to the targeted areas and populations and for their service expertise.
5.1 New kind of mutual dependency?
A simultaneous and important trend in public-private sector relationships in social welfare services is
the government’s reversal of its historically hostile stance toward for-profit firms. For-profit firms
have been bidding for and getting government contracts to manage social welfare programs since
1996 in the wake of massive welfare reform initiatives. While the move of for-profit firms into this
traditionally non-profit turf was initially dismissed as “poverty profiteering”, for-profit firms are now
                                                
1 Through the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 and its supporting legislation, the federal
government requires banks to provide credit and banking services in all areas where they are
chartered to do business.  Such legislation is designed to promote social investment by banks to
combat their long-standing patterns of discrimination in many credit markets throughout the United
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managing dozens of new multi-million dollar welfare-to-work programs nation-wide (Ryan, 1999).
Outsourcing to for-profit firms has been an answer to politicians’ desire to unload management
responsibilities of large scale social welfare programs. Driving the increasing reliance on for-profit
firms is the assumption that for-profits are more experienced at managing complex systems than non-
profit organisations. Not only do for-profit firms generally have better management information
systems, but they also tend to have more collateral to guard against contract failure than most non-
profits.  So, for-profit firms are the logical outsourcing choice for legislators intent on transforming
old bureaucratic social welfare regimes into what they hope are more efficient relationships based on
accountability.
Instead of shutting non-profit service providers out of the market, though, for-profit encroachment has
actually inspired a new kind of mutual dependency among for-profit firms and non-profit
organisations. In this new scheme, the government contracts out with for-profit firms for management
of social programs and for-profits then contract with non-profit organisations for service provision.
For-profit firms may have the technical expertise and organisational capacity to manage large-scale
delivery systems, but they often lack local access and specialised service provision expertise.  So, for-
profit firms come to rely on non-profit organisations to help them fulfil their contracts at the provision
end of the delivery system. For-profits become the middleman entity between government purchasers
and non-profit providers.
6 Lasting changes
There is not much doubt that non-profits can survive in this new competitive climate for two
important reasons. First and as we describe above, non-profit commercial activities tend to be
innovative and profitable.  Second, non-profit response to external pressures from the for-profit sector
increasingly involves some degree of co-ordination and collaboration among the public, non-profit,
and for-profit sectors.  In fact, the cross-sector collaboration strategy is a proxy for innovation,
growth, and success in self-reflective discussion about the future of the civil society in the United
States (Independent Sector, 2000; Fosler, 2000a; Fosler, 2000b). Leaders in all three economic
sectors agree that social, political, and economic forces are bringing the three sectors together more
than they have in the past. In fact, recent discourse among leaders in these sectors suggests that the
US is experiencing the death of an old civil society and the birth of a new civil society.
The old civil society was characterised by large federal spending for social programs, heavy
regulation of an industrial economy, and a service and advocacy-oriented non-profit sector. The new
civil society is largely a response to the changing nature of the economy, rather than a change in the
                                                                                                                                        
States (For further discussion see Squires 1992).
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fundamental needs of the American population. As economic relationships globalise, local-global
divides collapse, and information technology grows and develops exponentially, the three economic
sectors struggle to keep pace with such rapid and wide-ranging change. The result is an increasingly
more streamlined government engaged in massive deregulation and devolution of control to localities.
Politicians and policy-makers make these moves in their efforts to facilitate the flexibility that the
business and non-profit sectors need to compete in a new global economy where change and
innovation occur at lightning speed. Not surprisingly, this shift is consequential for public-private
partnerships. These partnerships “look” different now than they did 10 years ago. In fact, they look
more like partnerships than they did in the past. In table 1, we summarise some of the old and new
patterns affecting public-private relationships.
One result of the shift from old to new patterns a growing consensus that all three sectors share both
an interest in and responsibility for the provision of public goods. Government, business and non-
profits are more collectively making the types of human investments that promote a well-educated,
healthy workforce and a well-informed citizenry. Currently, however, that the public agenda is shared
is where the consensus ends. Still in debate are the specific responsibilities and advantages each
sector brings to the table.
Another major set of changes is in the structure of the public-private partnerships.  Largely as a result
of privatisation and other types of devolution, the nature of the relationship has changed from one of
top-down decision-making to more consensus-oriented collaborative decision-making. Since the
private sector generally leads the public sector in the adoption of new technology and management
techniques, the public sector often defers to the expertise of that sector to develop best practises in the
provision of public goods. At the same time, the public sector’s drive to become more efficient
heightens their attention to oversight and accountability. This climate of accountability has also re-
oriented private sector organisations from attention to their concrete missions of outreach and service
provision to a more abstract focus on capacity-building. The new civil society climate drives non-
profit organisations and business firms alike to continually develop and demonstrate their capacity to
grow and adapt to the swiftly evolving economy. Again, there is little consensus among practitioners
as to what capacity should look like, not surprising considering the diversity and scope of
contemporary non-profit and business sectors.
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Table 1: Public-private partnership patterns
Characteristics Old pattern New pattern
Domain of public goods
provision
Government Government, business and non-
profit sector
Sector borders Solid Fluid
Managerial focus Service provision Capacity-building
Nature of partnership Delegation Oversight and accountability
Decision-making Vertical Horizontal
7 Conclusion
This paper looked at public-private partnerships in the United States. Co-operation between
government and the non-profit sector has a long history in this country, and is, as we have seen,
deeply rooted in its ideological and cultural make-up. This system of third party government,
however, has neither been stable, nor comprehensive in its coverage over time. Pushed along by
major policy initiatives that periodically seemingly revolutionised the substance and practice of
government-non-profit relations, public-private partnerships remained a flexible and open system,
unaffected by standardisation any more comprehensive policy would bring about.
At the turn of the century, it seems as if we are witnessing the beginnings of an emerging trend that
could lead to major changes in public-private partnerships. As we have seen, blurring sectoral
boundaries have become more frequent, and the role of for-profit firms has become more pronounced.
While it is difficult to gauge what the end result of these developments might be, it is safe to assume
that more complex forms of partnerships will evolve.  Future policy scenarios will increasingly
include various combinations among government, business and non-profit providers.  What is more,
the three-way partnerships of the future will involve organisations no longer strictly bound by their
legal form or sector membership. Organisational form may become more project-specific rather than
a constant as was the case in the past.
What is more, project-specific rather than policy-specific partnership will allow more flexibility in
developing contract regimes sensitive to local circumstances and challenges. At the same time, such
developments make it necessary for local governments in particular not only to improve governance
and accountability requirements but to put in place new ones that may be more in line with the
complex partnership arrangements of the future. Standard public administration programs and tools
will most certainly not measure up to the new contract regimes.
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Of course, these policy developments also have theoretical implications.  In a sense, they introduce a
new twist to the government failure and voluntary failure theories: Are for-profit providers the
“missing links” that helps governments overcome policy inertia in dealing with non-profit
organisations, and non-profit organisations overcome commercialisation pressures that may threaten
their basic raison d’être. In theoretical terms at least, we are moving from partnerships to quasi-
markets, or at least to “staged scenarios” where each form brings in its own competitive advantage
that supposedly compensates for the disadvantages of others.  The outcome of this development is far
from clear: will such staged markets sort out the “good” and “bad” for-profit firms; will non-profit
organisations be overwhelmed by the temptations of profit motive and compromise their social
agendas; and will governments—like the sorcerer’s apprentice—be able to master the forces they
unleashed?
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